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are made in a competitive environment. Various stakeholders observe the tax payments 
and evaluate these against the relevant peer group, which creates interdependencies in 
the tax planning activities of firms. Introducing the concept of reputational loss we show 
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model. Empirical evidence suggests that benchmarking takes place both within 
countries and within industries, however for the latter it is important to include firms in 
large non-EU OECD countries. Further, the analysis shows that spatial interdependence 
is stronger for the largest firms and if they have an average effective tax rate above the 
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1 Introduction
One of the perpetuating forces of tax competition is based on the desire of
(multinational) firms to reduce the burden of taxation on profits. This force
is not only responsible for shifts of capital across borders, but also motivates
the multitude of strategies that firms adopt to lower their effective tax rate
(ETR).1 However, despite the widespread belief that extensive tax planning
takes place, there is rather little research concerned with the underlying de-
terminants. In the paper, we argue that firms’ tax planning decisions, similar
to their other operational decisions, are made in a competitive environment.
Various stakeholders of the firm can observe tax payments and evaluate
these against the relevant peer group, leading to interdependencies in the tax
planning activities of firms.
In this paper we capture this dynamic in a theoretical model which
introduces a reputational loss. Managers have to balance the benefits of a
reduced tax burden against the costs of a loss in reputation if they deviate
too much from the behaviour of their peer group. This is neatly summed up
in the introduction of the tax benchmarking studies done by the international
accountancy firm PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2009) stating ’a current challenge
for the tax professional is to identify the right balance when planning for taxes.
On the one side of the balance, taxes are a significant cost to the corporation
and should be controlled and managed in the quest to create shareholder value
and maximise earnings per share. On the other side, the amount of tax paid
by large corporations is coming under increasing scrutiny and stirring public
debate.’
This statement highlights some of the complexity of this benchmarking
process. In consequence we see the concept of the reputational loss as a multi-
facetted phenomenon, as various shareholders pursue conflicting interests.
Shareholders are likely to prefer a low ETR, analysts might be concerned with
sustainability of the ETR, while the tax authorities and critical consumers
want to see the corporation pay its ’fair share’ of income taxes. However,
all of these stakeholders have only limited information about the firms’ true
situation. Therefore they evaluate the observable tax payments relative to the
peer group. This leads to a yardstick-like form of competition where managers
anticipate their competitors moves and optimise their own behaviour. This in
turn creates a positive interdependence in the choice of tax sheltering, which
1Throughout the paper ETR denotes the ratio of tax paid to pre-tax profit. For a survey
and discussion of early empirical evidence see Hines (1999).
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we can test empirically.
Using a spatial econometric approach we find evidence for interdependence
in the ETR. Our results confirm the existence of spatial interdependence
between firms in the same country and between firms in the same industry.
However, in the latter case, positive reaction functions are only found for
developed countries. Further, we find a stronger interdependence for firms,
which have an ETR above the average of their peer group.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the
strands of literature we build our analysis on. Section 3 provides a small the-
oretical model showing the spatial dependence, which is empirically tested in
section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Previous literature
Income taxes and the avoidance thereof have been the focus of the academic
discussion for some time. Hence a lot of the features we include in our model
can be found in some form in earlier literature. In consequence this section
aims only to summarize the most important strands of literature rather than
providing a complete review of the related literature.
The earlier contributions deal with evasion of personal income tax and
build on the economic analysis of crime of Becker (1968).2 In a seminal article
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model the decision of how much taxes to evade
as a function of the probability of being audited and penalized. Reinganum
and Wilde (1985) analyse the auditing decisions of the tax authorities in a
principal agent framework and introduce the idea that the auditing probability
depends on the reported income. Although not explicitly modelled, the idea
of an ’audit cutoff’ implies some evaluation against the other tax payers.
In a different context Shleifer (1985) introduces the concept of yardstick
competition, which models the use of peer group comparison to infer the true
situation of the firms. Translating these two ideas into our model, we assume
that the tax authorities compare the reported income of companies with the
relevant peer group in order to decide which firms will come under scrutiny.
For example in the United Kingdom, the tax authorities are introducing a risk
rating for the biggest corporations based on a combination of organisiational
features and past tax behaviour.3 Another aspect of HMRC as a stakeholder
2See Slemrod (2007) for a review of the literature on personal income tax evasion.
3See Freedman et al. (2008) for an discussion of this risk rating.
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is that it can easily prove to be beneficial for the firm to pay more taxes today
in order to be in the ’good book’ and have a better stance in influencing future
tax policy making.
Levenson (1999, p. 16) directly mentions a further stakeholder evaluating
corporate tax behaviour, stating ’[t]his reduction [in the ETR] translates
to higher earnings per share and ultimately places companies in a more
favorable light with analysts when compared to competitors.’ Along these lines
Abarbanell and Bushee (1998) and Swenson (1999) expect that a lower ETR
send positive signals to the stock market.
More recent contributions, mostly by economists, find mixed evidence for a
negative relationship between ETR and stock market valuation. For example,
Desai and Hines (2002) analyse corporate inversions, where the headquarter is
relocated to a tax haven. They find that in the longer run, these aggressive tax
planning activities lead to a reduced stock price. The subsequent discussion of
Slemrod (2004) concludes that corporate tax planning needs to be analysed in
a larger framework including the shareholders. Crocker and Slemrod (2005)
and Chen and Chu (2005) provide formal theoretical principal-agent models
of corporate income tax evasion with agency costs. Desai and Dharmapala
(2006a, 2006b) find evidence for this model of tax sheltering and managerial
diversion. They conclude that increased corporate tax sheltering increases the
firms value only in combination with good corporate governance. Otherwise
the increased opportunities for diversion of profits dominate the tax saving
effect.4
A different strand of literature aims to explain the tax paying behaviour
of corporations. The earliest contributions can be found in the accounting
literature.5 Firm size is identified as an important determinant, as large
firms have more resources to optimize their tax planning, which would imply
a lower ETR. At the same time large corporations are expected to be
audited more often, creating higher political costs of tax planning for larger
firms.6 Subsequently, more determinants of the ETR were introduced into the
analysis. Wilkie (1988) discusses the importance of the profitability, Gupta
and Newberry (1997) find that the asset mix and leverage matters, which is
confirmed by Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998). Further Leblang (1998)
4For further evidence for this hypothesis see Desai et al (2007) and Desai and Dharmapala
(2007).
5See Rego (2003) for a summary and discussion of this literature.
6See Zimmerman (1983) and Omer, Molloy, and Ziebart (1993) for a discussion and early
evidence for the political cost hypothesis.
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argues that firms with more multinational activity have more tax planning
opportunities.7 More recently, Graham and Tucker (2006) analyse 44 tax
sheltering cases and identify firm size and profitability as determinants of firms
which are using tax sheltering.
Finally, a small number of authors have addressed the impact of society on
tax paying behaviour. Posner (2000) discusses the impact of social norms on
income tax compliance, and Weisbach (2002) considers this idea for corporate
tax compliance as well. However, he dismisses the idea that social norms
are able to explain the absence of more tax avoidance and concludes with a
’undersheltering puzzle’. In contrast, we argue in this paper that social norms,
or more generally pressure from the wider public, add into the reputational
loss and mitigate the benefits from tax sheltering. For example the newspaper
’The Guardian’ ran an investigation into the tax payments of the FTSE 100
companies and commented on the ETR of the biggest companies.8
Consequently, firms may increasingly face an ’outrage constraint’ when de-
ciding about their tax payments. The term ’outrage constraint’ was coined by
Bebchuk and Fried (2004), where they argue that managers can not get away
with too high executive compensation, because shareholders and/or consumers
will simply not tolerate this. Similar things are expected to occur in the case of
corporate tax payments. However, given the diverse and complex nature of the
stakeholders both an inexplicably high or very low ETR might lead to ’outrage’.
3 Theoretical model
Before we introduce our stylized model, a clarification about the use of
our notation is apposite. Note that we use the term potential gross profit
in an rather wide and abstract way. Given the previous discussion of the
multifacetted problem of the reputational loss, the concept of a potential
gross profit could be used somewhat interchangeably with the term firm value.
The use of firm value implies an easier interpretation of some aspects of the
reputational costs, e.g. via the channels of a lower evaluation by analysts,
the loss of potential consumers or the fact of not having a good relationship
with the tax authorities. In contrast, under the name potential gross profit the
modelling of the tax sheltering is more intuitive and other aspects of the costs
are easily implementable, e.g. the cost of tax audits and the tax sheltering
7Collins and Shackelford (1999) find only inconclusive evidence for this hypothesis.
8See www.theguardian.co.uk/taxgap. For further examples of political pressure from the
wider public, see the publications of Citizen for tax justice (United States) or Taxjustice
network (International).
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costs themselves. In sum we will use the term potential gross profit henceforth
as it leaves us with a more coherent stylized model.9 Nevertheless the reader
should bear in mind the various possible interpretations of the term.
Consider a world with two firms, denoted with the subscripts i and j. Each
firm has a potential gross profit of pii. Of this profit the firm can shelter the
fraction θi from corporate taxes t. However, tax planning involves two types
of costs. First there is the cost of tax planning itself C and secondly there is a
reputational loss of L depending on its own tax planning activities relative to
those of its competitors. The net profit Πi of firm i is therefore
Πi = (1− t(1− θi)) [pii − C(θi)−R(∆θij)] (1)
where ∆θij = θi − θj and i 6= j.
We assume that the tax sheltering costs C are increasing and convex in
θi. In order to provide an analytical solution to the model we choose a simple
functional form with the necessary properties. More specifically we set
C(θi) = α
θ2i
2
where α > 0. (2)
Further the firm incurs a reputational loss depending on its tax planning
in comparison to its competitor’s tax planning. Again, we assume that the
reputational loss is increasing and convex in the absolute difference between θi
and θj and use the simple functional form of
R(∆θij) = β
(θi − θj)2
2
where β > 0. (3)
Each firm chooses its fraction of tax sheltering in order to maximise their
after tax profit. The alternative interpretation would be that a manager max-
imises firm value, which can be motivated by compensation linked to the stock
market performance. Inserting (2) and (3) in (1) and partially deriving with
respect to θi yields
∂Πi
∂θi
= t
[
pii − αθ
2
i
2
− β (θi − θj)
2
2
]
+ (1− t(1− θi)) [−αθi − β(θi − θj)] (4)
The first term represents the marginal tax savings and the second term the
marginal costs of sheltering more profits from taxation. Optimally θi is chosen
so that these two terms equal. Solving for the optimal θi yields
9See also Moore (2008) for a different theoretical approach to tax benchmarking, where
managers optimise the ETR in order to avoid being voted off by the shareholders.
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θ˜i =
1
3t(α+ β)
[
(α+ β)(t− 1) + 2βtθj (5)
+
√
[(α+ β)(t− 1) + 2βtθj ]2 + 3t(α+ β) [βθj(2− 2t− tθj) + 2piit]
]
Note that this reaction function only holds if 3t/3(α+β) 6= 0. For t = 0 the
reaction function collapses to θ˜i = βθj/(α+ β) which implies an equilibrium at
θi = θj = 0.
Proposition 1: There is a positive interdependence in the tax sheltering
behaviour of firms.
Proof: Deriving the first order condition in 4 with respect to θi and θj
yields
− αtθidθi − βt(θi − θj)dθi + t[−αθi − β(θi − θj)]dθi+
[1− t(1− θi)](−α− β)dθi + βt(θi − θj)dθj + β[1− t(1− θi)] dθj = 0 (6)
which can be simplified to
dθi
dθj
=
β[t(θi − θj) + 1− t(1− θi)]
2βt(θi − θj) + 2αtθi + (α+ β)[1− t(1− θi)] (7)
This expression is unambiguously positive for if θi ≥ θj . For θi < θj this
term will only be negative if either the denominator or the numerator, but not
both, are negative. The numerator will be negative if the following condition is
met
θj >
1− t
t
+ 2θi. (8)
The first part on this expression implies that all values of t < 0.5 would
demand, irrespective of the competitors behaviour, more than 100 percent of
tax sheltering for the numerator to become negative.
Further, rearranging (7) to
dθi
dθj
=
β[t(θi − θj) + 1− t(1− θi)]
β[t(θi − θj) + 1− t(1− θi)] + βt(θi − θj) + α[1− t(1− 3θi)] (9)
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it can be shown that the denominator is smaller than the numerator if
βt(θi − θj) > α[1− t(1− 3θi)] or
θj <
β − 3α
β
θi − α
βt
(1− t). (10)
which can not be fulfilled if θj needs to be larger than θi. In consequence
the denominator is larger than the numerator which in turn can only be
negative for unrealistically high tax rates.
Proposition 2: With a higher corporate tax rate firms shelter a bigger
fraction of profits against taxation.
Proof: The partial derivative of (5) with respect to t captures the direct
effect of a change in the tax rate, which is given through
∂θ˜i
∂t
=
1
3t2
 (α+ β)(t− 1)− βtθj√
[(α+ β)(t− 1) + 2βtθj ]2 + 3t(α+ β) [βθj(2− 2t− tθj) + 2piit]
+ 1
 .
(11)
This expression is unambiguously positive, as the denominator is positive
and absolutely larger than the negative numerator. This ensures that the value
of the fraction is negative, but smaller than unity which ensures that the term
in the brackets is positive. This implies that each firm, ceteris paribus, increases
its tax sheltering activity in response to an increase of the tax rate. Proposition
1 further states a positive response to an increase in the other firms tax shel-
tering activities. Hence this tax effect is intensified and unambiguously positive.
Proposition 3: Firms with higher profits shelter a bigger fraction of
profits against taxation.
Proof: Deriving (5) with respect to the pii yields
∂θ˜i
∂pii
=
t√
[(1− t)(α+ β)− 2βtθj ]2 + 3t(α+ β) [βθj(2− 2t− tθj) + 2piit]
. (12)
which is unambiguously positive. Therefore, all else equal, firms with larger
profits shelter a bigger fraction against corporate taxes.
Under the assumption of identical cost functions for both firms, equivalent
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reaction functions for firm j can be derived. Parameterizing the model,
propositions 1 and 2 are illustrated Figure (1). The solid black line displays
the optimal θ˜ for firm i and the grey line shows the equivalent for firm j.
The dotted lines show the changed reaction functions for an increase in the
statutory tax rate.
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Figure 1: Symmetric equilibrium
An increase in the profit of a firm (pii) would lead to a shift of the reaction
function, similar to the shift of one firm because of a change in the tax rate. In
contrast, a change in the cost function parameters (α or β) would rotate the
reaction functions.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data
Most of the stakeholders described in the previous two subsections, have
only access to publicly available data. This suggests that the correct dataset
should be the published annual accounts, since it is these accounts that
shareholders and analysts or the wider public will use to benchmark the
company’s performance. And in anticipating this, it is this ETR measure
which the managers set at the optimal level. The tax authorities do have
further information about how much the firms actually paid in their coun-
try, however, if they wish to compare the tax behaviour of multinational
companies in other countries, they are also restricted to publicly available
9
data. We, therefore, use accounting data for our empirical analysis. More
specifically, we use the largest available dataset of firm-level accounts, ORBIS,
provided by Bureau van Dijk. As the concept of a reputational loss is more
applicable to large corporations, we restrict our dataset to consolidated
accounts. On top of that we restrict our sample to the largest 500 companies
in each country.10 The reflects the fact that most stakeholders focus their at-
tention on the biggest companies, rather than on small and medium sized firms.
ORBIS usually provides a time window of the latest ten years. In order to
overcome this restriction, we combine an earlier download from the October
2006 version with a download from the current version as in December 2008.
In consequence we have a time window from 1993 to 2008, with a partly
overlapping sample. In total we download 50,102 firms from the old version
and 48,330 partly overlapping firms from the current version.
We define our dependent variable (ETR) as the ratio of the tax as reported
in the accounts and the pre tax profit. This implies that the variable will
be undefined when the pre tax profit is zero. Further, in the case of a loss,
this ratio can be misleading. We therefore exclude all observations with a
misleading outcome and set the ETR to zero, where it is undefined because of
zero pre tax profit. Alternatively one could exclude all loss making companies
on the grounds that they face a different optimisation problem. However this
would increase the truncation of the dataset even more. We will return to the
issue of the loss making companies in the sensitivity analysis.
We also include the following control variables from ORBIS. Firm size
(SIZE) is measured as the logarithm of total assets. Profitability is measured
through the return on assets (ROA), defined as earnings before interest divided
through total assets. Potential interest deductibility is captured by leverage
(DEBT ), which we measure as the sum of current and noncurrent liabilities
as a share of total assets.11 We also control for capital intensity (CAPINT ),
defined as the share of tangible fixed assets in total assets, and intangibles
assets (INTANG), defined as the share of intangible assets in total assets.
In order to avoid problems because of outliers we drop the top and bottom
10We use the 500 firms with the largest average total assets over the whole period of obser-
vation. To increase the balancedness of our sample we restrict our sample to 500 companies
after the cleaning process described below.
11We include current liabilities, as the split between current and noncurrent liabilities ap-
pears to be varying across countries. See also Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodeme (2008) for a
similar approach.
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percentile of all variables.12 We then use only those firms for which we have at
least 4 contiguous observations on each firm, and at least ten firms per country.
This leaves us with a sample of 73,784 observations in 10,031 firms, with country
coverage as described in Table 1.
Table 1: Country coverage
OECD countries Non-OECD Asian countries
Country Firms Observations Country Firms Observations
Australia 500 3,606 China 500 3,979
Austria 55 421 Hongkong 131 1,095
Belgium 79 554 India 494 3,350
Canada 454 3,406 Indonesia 115 704
Czech Republic 15 95 Malaysia 500 3,940
Denmark 66 495 Pakistan 73 506
Finland 81 632 Philippines 81 636
France 385 2,894 Russia 39 250
Germany 421 2,877 Singapore 300 2,272
Greece 65 479 Sri Lanka 23 171
Hungary 10 71 Taiwan 160 1,136
Iceland 15 84 Thailand 500 3,200
Ireland 445 2,423 Vietnam 23 135
Italy 114 847
Japan 500 3,527
Luxembourg 18 110 Other countries/Tax Havens
Mexico 85 707 Country Firms Observations
Netherlands 500 4,190 Argentina 24 141
New Zealand 79 575 Bermuda 273 2,062
Norway 64 464 Brazil 111 787
Poland 29 185 Cayman Islands 206 1,293
Portugal 32 225 Chile 126 938
Spain 85 638 Costa Rica 11 70
Sweden 149 1,079 Egypt 113 678
Switzerland 244 2,032 Israel 76 505
Turkey 52 302 Jamaica 10 56
United Kingdom 500 4,207 Jordan 62 404
United States 500 4,394 Kuwait 25 149
Mauritius 30 232
Non-OECD European countries Morocco 34 249
Country Firms Observations Oman 39 262
Latvia 10 70 Saudi Arabia 50 352
Lithuania 167 1,276 South Africa 155 1,165
Slovenia 12 84 Tunisia 16 118
As the distinction into geographical regions in Table 1 already suggests,
the spectrum of countries in our sample is very broad and it is likely to be
misleading if we include all firms in the same regressions. We therefore split
our sample according to this geographical breakdown. This also implies that
12With the exception of SIZE, where we only drop the smallest observations. We also
eliminate all observations with a leverage bigger than unity. A complete description of the
cleaning process is available from the authors upon request.
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we think that firms do not compare themselves - nor are they compared to each
other by various stakeholders - to firms in completely different geographical
regions.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
OECD (28 countries/41,519 observations )
Variable Minimum Median Maximum Average Std. Dev.
ETR -0.75 0.30 1.80 0.29 0.19
SIZE 7.02 13.47 20.49 13.41 2.09
ROA -0.73 0.08 0.42 0.09 0.08
CAPINT 0.00 0.29 1.00 0.33 0.25
INTANG 0.00 0.02 0.96 0.09 0.15
DEBT 0.00 0.58 1.00 0.56 0.20
European Union (21 countries/23,852 observations)
Variable Minimum Median Maximum Average Std. Dev.
ETR -0.75 0.29 1.80 0.28 0.19
SIZE 7.05 12.99 20.42 12.97 2.05
ROA -0.69 0.07 0.42 0.08 0.07
CAPINT 0.00 0.28 1.00 0.33 0.25
INTANG 0.00 0.02 0.89 0.09 0.13
DEBT 0.00 0.61 1.00 0.58 0.20
Asia (13 countries/21,374 observations)
Variable Minimum Median Maximum Average Std. Dev.
ETR -0.71 0.21 1.80 0.21 0.17
SIZE 7.00 11.88 18.89 11.99 1.57
ROA -0.72 0.08 0.42 0.09 0.07
CAPINT 0.00 0.35 0.99 0.36 0.23
INTANG 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.02 0.06
DEBT 0.00 0.48 1.00 0.47 0.20
Other countries/Tax havens (17 countries/9,461 observations)
Variable Minimum Median Maximum Average Std. Dev.
ETR -0.74 0.15 1.80 0.17 0.17
SIZE 7.42 11.87 18.69 12.03 1.69
ROA -0.67 0.10 0.42 0.11 0.09
CAPINT 0.00 0.27 0.99 0.31 0.24
INTANG 0.00 0.00 0.91 0.03 0.07
DEBT 0.00 0.45 1.00 0.44 0.21
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the various geographical groups.
Not surprisingly firms are rather similar in the partly overlapping OECD and
the EU subsample. However there is a clear distinction between these two
subsamples and the two other subsamples. Most notably the firms in the
developed countries have a higher average ETR of approximately 29 percent,
in contrast to Asian firms with an average ETR of only 21 percent.13 Firms
domiciled in Latin America, the Middle East or tax haven countries have an
13We will use the term developed countries as a label for the combined sample of OECD
and non-OECD EU countries.
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even lower ETR, with an average of only 17 percent.
In terms of other characteristics, the firms in the developed countries are
larger on average, which is mostly due to the fact that the restriction to the 500
largest companies is more binding for these subsamples.14 Furthermore firms
in the OECD and EU have a larger share of intangibles, appear to have a large
return on assets and have a larger average share of debt of approximately 58
percent. In comparison, firms headquartered in tax haven countries have only
44 percent of debt on average.
4.2 Empirical strategy
To test for the existence of spatial interdependence we specify a spatial autore-
gressive (SAR) model that can estimate the relationship between an individual
firm’s ETR and that of its competitors. In equation (13) the individual firm’s
ETRi,t is a function of its competitors’ ETRs.
ETRi,t = ρ
∑
i 6=j
ωcij,tETRj,t + βXi,t + γτk,t + µi + εi,t (13)
Competitors’ ETRs are contained in
∑
i 6=j ω
c
ij,tETRj,t and ω
c
i,j,t selects
the appropriate competitors for each firm i in each period t from the vector
of all firms’ ETRs (ETRj,t). The set of competitors c varies by year and
across firms (we discuss the selection of competitors later). This matrix is
often referred to in the literature as the ‘weighting’ or ‘connectivity’ matrix.
It will have a positive value if the current firm is related to another, and
zero otherwise. The size of the positive value will reflect the strength of
the relationship between the firms. This allows us to specify a relationship
between the current firm’s ETR and competitors’ ETRs. The estimate of the
parameter ρ will tell us the sign, size and significance of competitors’ ETRs
in determining the firm’s ETR. We also include a set of firm-level control
variables Xi,t consistent with the literature discussed in Section 2, the statu-
tory corporate tax rate τk,t in country k, along with a set of firm fixed effects µi.
Specifying the weighting matrix: In this study, we would like to
choose the competitor firms which represent the most likely benchmark set of
firms that shareholders will use. This requires some judgement as there is no
obvious best way to choose competitors. For this reason, we specify a number
of alternative weighting matrices which we can trial.
14Descriptive statistics for the unrestricted sample are available from the authors upon
request.
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The weights in the weighting matrix are designed to select the most
important competitors for each firm. To this end we define a dummy
variable δcij which takes a positive value if the competitor is in the same
reference group c and zero otherwise. Specifically we use three different
sets of reference groups, all firms in the same country, all firms in the same
NACE 2-digit industry and all firms in the same industry or within the
same country. In the first two cases δcij is unity if the competitor is in
the same country or industry respectively. In the the third specification of
the weighting matrix the dummy is unity if the competitor is either in the
same country or in the same industry. If the competitor is both in the same
industry and the same country, the dummy is added up and takes the value two.
Further, we think it is unrealistic that companies are compared or are com-
paring themselves to hundreds of competitors. Therefore we also include a
dummy κcij,t which is set equal to unity if the competitor is similar in size.
Namely we allow the 20 companies closest in size to have a positive weight in
the weighting matrix. This sparse design of the weighting matrix also has the
benefit that the weighted competitors tax rates have more cross section vari-
ation which helps to distinguish their impact from a common shock or pure
time effect. This is especially important as we have a large cross section of
firms.15 We finally allocate each competitor a specific weight, which is defined
as a quadratic inverse distance between the size of the current firm and the
competitor in question. The inverse distance measure ensures that similarly
sized firms get greatest weight and the quadratic form allows firms to be sim-
ilar in size if they are larger or smaller than the current firm.16 Formally, the
weights are defined as
ωcij,t = δ
c
ijκ
c
ij,t|SIZEi,t − SIZEj,t|−0.2. (14)
We further normalise the weights to sum to unity.17
4.2.1 Econometric issues
Estimation of equation (13) using OLS will yield biased and inconsistent
estimates of α because the weighted competitors’ ETRs will be correlated with
each firm’s error term εit. Correcting for this spatial endogeneity problem has
been approached in a number of ways.18 We follow a standard approach as
15See Overesch and Rincke (2009) for a discussion this problem.
16We also did run the regressions without the size weighting and the results are qualitatively
similar. The full set of results is available from the authors upon request.
17See Anselin (1988) for a discussion about row standardization.
18See Brueckner (2003) for a discussion of this issue.
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proposed by Kelejian and Robinson (1993) and Kelejian and Prucha (1998)19
and use a 2 stage least squares procedure in which spatially lagged explanatory
variables are used to instrument for the spatially lagged dependent variables.
A further issue arising with our empirical specification is that some of the
control variables are endogenous. This is most obvious for our measure of the
profitability (ROA) as a measure of the pre tax profit is used in both the depen-
dent and independent variable. We therefore also instrument for profitability
(ROA) using the market power of the company and the industry concentration.
For the market power we use market share and market share squared, where
market share is defined as the operating revenues of the companies in the year t
as a fraction of the sum of operating revenues of all firms within the same coun-
try in the year t. For industry concentration we use the Herfindahl-Hirschmann
Index, defined as the sum of the squared market shares within country and
2-digit NACE industry.20
4.3 Baseline Results
Following the definition of δcij we use Equation (14) to construct three
weighting matrices. First, we include all firms in the weighting matrix with
their domicile in the same country. Our rationale for this weighting matrix is
that, competition may take place among, for example, FTSE 100 companies
irrespective of their industry. Secondly we include all firms that operate in the
same industry. This captures the idea, that firms are evaluated against similar
companies across borders, which is in line with the benchmarking studies PWC
is conducting. And finally we combine the first two weighting matrices and
include companies within the same industry or country, which an increased
weight if both criteria are fulfilled.
We run the regression as specified in equation (13) for each subsample with
three different measures of the competitors ETRs. Table 3 reports the results.
The first line represents the reaction to the ETRs of competitors within the
same country. In line with the theoretical prediction of proposition 1 the
coefficient is significantly positive for all but the tax haven subsample.21 The
latter is relatively unsurprising since firms that locate their headquarter in a
tax haven country are less likely to be concerned with reputational loss due to
19See also Anselin et al. (2008).
20See Cowling and Waterson (1976) or Machin and Van Reenen (1993) for evidence on the
connection between market share, industry concentration and profitability.
21Note that we have some problems with the quality of instruments especially in the Asian
subsample. Using different clustering would alleviate the problem, but for consistency reasons
we use the same clustering for all specifications.
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their tax payments.
The second line presents the results for benchmarking within 2-digit-NACE
industries and regardless of the location of the headquarter. While the coeffi-
cient is still significantly positive for the OECD countries and the firms in the
Asian subsample, we have some difficulty finding valid instruments. Intuitively,
weighted industry-averages of ETRs are more difficult to instrument through
industry weighted averages of the explanatory variables, if there is significant
variation in these variables across countries.22 Strikingly, the coefficient is
completely insignificant for the European Union headquartered firms, which
implies that there is no interaction in the effective tax rates across industries
in the European Union. Given the large overlap with the OECD subsample,
where we can observe some evidence for tax benchmarking, this appears
counterintuitive at first. There is, however, a potential simple explanation for
the insignificance of the coefficient in the European Union subsample. If the
benchmarking within the industry does involve the industry leader - which
incidentally is very often located in the United States or Japan - the set of
potential competitors might be too small, if only the European Union countries
are included.
The third line displays the reaction functions between firms within the
same country or the same for the 2-digit-NACE industries. This is basically
a combination of the two first weighting matrices with the added benefit that
it overcomes border problems. If we estimate the reactions functions of firms
within the same country we are in fact estimating a number of independent
systems, because the reaction functions do not spill across country borders. In
contrast, the spatial model with competitors in the same industry or country
allows for influences across borders. Intuitively one would expect coefficients
to lie somewhere between the coefficients for benchmarking only within the
country or only within the industries. While this is the case for the European
Union subsample the coefficient is actually larger and more significant for the
OECD subsample. This result highlights once more the fact that industry
benchmarking appear to be driven by important firms in the largest OECD
countries. Similarly, there are significant coefficients for the country-industry
weighted competitors ETRs for the Asian subsample, again, with the caveat
of weak instruments. In this case, the results based on a combined weighting
matrix display a slightly lower and less significant coefficient, which could
22This problem can be even more aggravated if the country coverage is not stable over time
(e.g. if new countries like the Eastern European countries enter the sample), which implies a
change in the set of competitors.
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indicate that a number of firms in this subsample compare themselves to
competitors within the same country, while a different number of firms mainly
compare themselves within their industry.
Profitability, measured through the return on assets (ROAi,t) exhibits
the expected (significantly) negative sign for all subsamples. Given that the
ROAi,t is also instrumented, namely through market share of the firms and the
industry concentration, the same caveats concerning the quality of instruments
apply. However, there is a further important issue potentially driving the
results. It is now a widely held belief that firms aim to control and smooth the
income stream. Given the nature of our measure of the ETR, i.e. tax charges
in the accounts defined as the the share of pre tax profit, any form of earnings
management is expected to influence the ETR and in consequence the spatial
interdependence. In fact there appears to be a spatial interdependence in the
earnings management decision as well. The extent to which this influences our
results depends amongst other factors on the ability of the firms to separately
manage book and tax income.23
The firm size variable turns out significant for most specifications. Inter-
estingly enough, larger firms appear to have a lower ETR in the developed
countries while they seem to have a higher ETR in Asian, other emerging
or tax haven countries. Linking this back to the literature suggests that the
political costs hypothesis is more applicable for emerging markets. In developed
countries large companies appear to be able to use their size for better tax
planning. The leverage of firms exhibits a significantly positive coefficient for
all specifications, which is counterintuitive at first sight. A possible explanation
is the inclusion of firm specific fixed effects. This implies that the coefficients
describe the effect of changes rather than in levels. Therefore one could
interpret the positive coefficients in the way that firms with increasing ETRs
and low initial debt levels, increase their debt share to benefit from more
deductible interests in the future. Similarly, in the developed countries the the
share of intangibles (INTANGi,t) bears a significantly positive sign, which
could mirror changes in firm behaviour, e.g. increasingly using intangible
assets to facilitate profit shifting in the future in combination with a currently
increasing tax burden.
In most specifications the coefficient for the statutory corporate tax rate
23We are grateful to Dhammika Dharmapala for pointing us in this direction. While this is
an important topic which should be pursued in further research, it is clearly beyond the scope
of the current paper.
18
(τk,t) in the headquarter country is positive and significant. At first sight
this is in contradiction with proposition 2 which stipulates an increase in tax
sheltering in reaction of a higher statutory tax rate. However, the inclusion
of firm specific fixed effects implies that the coefficient of τk,t describes
the effect of a change in the statutory tax rate on the effective tax rate.
Abstracting from changes in the corporate tax base, this would hint at a
coefficient of one.24 Coefficients significantly lower than unity have two likely
explanations. First, the tax rate cut (increase) has been accompanied by a tax
base broadening (narrowing). Secondly, this could also be indirect evidence
of tax sheltering activities insofar as companies decide to include a greater
(smaller) proportion of their profits in the taxable profits as a reaction to
reduced (increased) statutory tax rates. Therefore, the positive coefficient,
significantly lower than unity, is consistent with the predictions in proposition 2.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis - Further Results
Allowing for asymmetric reactions to competitors: We stress the
multifaceted nature of the concept of a reputational loss. It is therefore likely
that managers do not follow competitors’ ETRs upwards and downwards in
the same measure. In fact, the specification of the theoretical model even
suggests a stronger downward adjustment for firms with ETRs above their peer
group, as the tax saving effect and the reduction of the reputational loss work
in the same direction then. Therefore, we want to investigate the possibility
of asymmetric responses to the benchmark ETR. Given that the relative tax
position of a firm, i.e. whether its ETR is higher or lower than the average
of the relevant peer group, is the result of the spatial interdependence so far,
this distinction is endogenous and can not be used to estimate asymmetric
reaction functions. To avoid this problem, we use the statutory corporate tax
rate as the threshold value. Intuitively, this seems to be a critical value, as it
appears to be difficult for anyone to argue that a firm is not paying its fair
share of taxes if it has an ETR equal or higher than the statutory tax rate.
Following the line of argument above we would expect a larger coefficient for
the competitors ETR if the firm itself has an ETR higher than the statutory
tax rate.
Table 4 presents some of the results, if we allow for asymmetric responses.25
24This logic is only applicable to firms operating only in their headquarter country. How-
ever, in reality one would still expect a coefficient somewhat different from one, because the
corporate tax base is likely to change as a result of the ordinary commercial activities of the
firm.
25In contrast to the baseline regressions we do not report the regression results for the tax
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The table is organized as follows. In each subsample the first two columns
represent the regression with firms that exhibit an ETR lower than the
statutory corporate tax rate. The third and fourth column then present the
same results for the firms with a higher ETR.
Starting with the first two and the fifth and sixth columns one can clearly
see, that the positive reaction to the competitors ETR is not evident if the
firm itself has an ETR lower than the corporate tax rate. Only for the
Asian subsample the firms with an ETR below the statutory tax rate still
positively react to their competitors effective tax rate. This is probably largely
due to the fact that around three quarter of the firms have an ETR lower
than the statutory corporate tax rate, but at the same time even this fact
does tell something about the nature of the benchmarking in these countries.
In contrast to the developed countries, there appear to be more downward
pressure for firms in the emerging Asian markets.
The sign for the profitability variable turns significantly positive for the
firms with a low ETR while the coefficient remains negative and increases
in size for those firms with a high ETR. This suggests that in the group of
firms with a low ETR the first stage regression is potentially dominated by
large negative outliers, i.e. loss making companies. Given the difficulties that
arise from potential loss carry forwards we will discuss the issue of losses in a
subsequent robustness check.
The other two variables which show significantly different signs depending
on which subset of firms we are looking at are SIZE and the statutory
corporate tax rate τ . While the size of the firm turns out to be significantly
negative for the firms with a higher ETR it is insignificant for the other firms.
Relating this to the two competing theories about the impact of firm size on
the tax burden, one can conjecture, that the political cost hypothesis holds
true in the sense, that it prevents the largest companies from lowering their tax
burden too far. At the same time the largest companies can exploit some of
their resources in order to avoid very large ETRs, reflected in the significantly
negative sign of the coefficient for SIZE for the subset of firms with higher
ETRs. The corporate statutory tax rate displays a larger coefficient for firms
with a higher ETR. Following the line of argument introduced above, this
reflects the more aggressive tax planning by firms with a lower effective tax rate.
haven subsample or for the industry-only weighted competitors tax rates. We are happy to
provide the interested reader with a full set of results, but exclude them here simply for reasons
of space.
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Stronger interaction between largest companies: We think that
the concept of a reputational loss, as we want to define it in this paper, is
more applicable to large corporations. There are a number of reasons for this.
For instance, corporations small enough not to be included in the leading
stock indices of their country are more likely to fall under the radar of critical
assessment. This holds in particular true for campaigns by NGOs fighting
against tax evasion/avoidance, but also for the scrutiny of tax authorities
where the natural starting place for auditing is also the pre-defined list of the
biggest corporations (e.g. FTSE 100 in the United Kingdom, or the DAX
in Germany). To test, whether the interaction in the tax behaviour between
these particularly publicly exposed firms is stronger, we rerun the regressions
with a reduced sample, including only the top 200 companies per country.26
The left half of table 5 displays the results for the developed countries,
i.e. the OECD and the EU subsample if we restrict the sample to up to 200
companies per country.27 Similar to the previous robustness check we report
the estimates for benchmarking within the country and within country or
industry. Comparing the results with the baseline results in Table 3 one can see
that the coefficients for the competitors ETR are somewhat larger and highly
significant. The test statistics for the instruments are also improved, indicating
that the model is correctly specified. Consistent with all the previous results
the influence of the ETR within the same industry seems to be stronger
only in the OECD subsample. Therefore one can conclude again that the
benchmarking within the same industry needs to include the main firms in
large non-EU OECD countries.
The potential role of loss making companies: Firms with a negative
taxable profit usually do not receive an immediate tax rebate but can carry
these tax losses forward to reduce future tax burdens. Therefore they face
a potentially different optimisation problem, as they are, at least from a legal
perspective, entitled to a lower effective tax rate. Unfortunately we do not have
the necessary information about the stock of loss carry forwards, to properly
account for this factor. But the right half of Table 5 shows the results where
we exclude all the companies with a non positive ETR from both the set of
26It is possible that benchmarking between these companies might be difficult as they are
difficult to compare to each other. In consequence the benchmarking and therefore the strate-
gic interaction could also be very important for the not so large companies, albeit for somewhat
different reasons. We tested this idea using only the firms 201 to 500 per country. However,
we find no evidence for strategic interaction analysing these firms.
27Again the results for the other subsamples are suppressed because of space considerations
and available from the authors upon request.
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observations and also on the potential set of competitors. This implies that
all observations with either a negative pre tax profit or a non positive tax
payment are dropped.28 As expected the results remain relatively unaffected
by the exclusion of these companies. Comparing the results to the baseline
results in Table 3 shows that the coefficients are similar in size and slightly
more significant. This is very much in line with our expectations, since this
robustness check is in fact excluding those companies for which our theory
least applies.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we argue that firms’ tax planning decisions are made in a
competitive environment. Stakeholders with various and partly competing
objectives observe tax payments and evaluate these against the relevant peer
group. As an example, tax authorities are interested in an adequate tax
payment, while shareholders probably would prefer to have lower tax payments
in order to increase the potential dividend payments. Deviation from the
behaviour of comparable firms therefore triggers some sort of reputational loss.
Firms anticipate this benchmarking and incorporate the consequences into
their tax planning strategy which creates interdependencies in the ETRs of
firms.
We aim to capture this influence in a theoretical model which introduces
a reputational loss. We see the concept of the reputational loss as a multi-
facetted phenomenon, as various stakeholders pursue conflicting interests. In
consequence, managers have to balance the benefits of a reduced tax burden
against the costs of a loss in reputation if they deviate too much from the
behaviour of their peer group. Anticipating this managers incorporate their
peer groups tax planning into their own decision process. This in turn creates
a positive interdependence, which we can test empirically.
Using a spatial econometric approach we find evidence for interdependence
in the ETR. In general, the positive spatial interdependence between the
ETRs of firms is significant between firms in the same country. This evidence
holds by and large for companies in the OECD, in the European Union and
in Asian countries. There is also evidence for strategic interaction within the
same industry, however, this is only apparent if firms in large non-EU OECD
28An alternative approach would be to (partly) collapse the panel into a cross section, which
would mitigate the time dimension issue of the loss carry forward. In fact we have collapsed
the firm data into four points of time and rerun the regression on this sample. The results
change only quantitatively and similar conclusion can be drawn.
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countries are included. This could be interpreted as evidence of the importance
of industry leaders in tax benchmarking. Firms with a high ETR respond
stronger to their peer groups ETR, which is in line with our theoretical
predictions since in this case the reduction of the reputational loss coincides
with a reduction of the tax burden.
Further, it appears to be the case that the benchmarking is most important
for the largest firms since they are at the centre of both the public debate and
the scrutiny of the tax authorities. Further it seems reasonable to assume that
the largest companies would engage in sophisticated tax planning as they have
the biggest tax departments. In conclusion, this paper argues that especially
the largest firms, who were so far expected to be most able to optimize their
tax affairs, are constrained in their tax planning through potential reputational
losses.
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